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Central Bank Communication and Correlation between Financial Markets: 
Canada and the United States 
 
Abstract 
We study the correlation between pairs of bond and stock markets in Canada and the United States 
between January 1998 and December 2009 in the framework of diagonal-BEKK models. Our research 
question is whether monetary policy actions and communications by the Bank of Canada and the 
Federal Reserve significantly affect the conditional co-movement of financial markets (i) within 
Canada and (ii) between Canada and the United States. We find that central bank communication 
significantly increases the correlation of financial markets within and across the two countries and is 
particularly important for the correlation of Canadian and US long-term interest rates. 
 
Keywords:  Bank of Canada, Central Bank Communication, Diagonal-BEKK Models, Dynamic 
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1. Introduction 
Central bank communication has become a lively topic of research during the last decade (for a 
survey of the relevant literature, see Blinder et al. 2008). Many central banks communicate with the 
public as a way of providing information about the future course of monetary policy as well as their 
views of the economic outlook. This information helps guide the expectation formation process in 
the private sector and improves transparency of monetary policy decisions. A large part of the 
relevant literature focuses on how monetary policy actions, particularly interest rate changes, affect 
financial markets; relatively few studies investigate the impact of communication, either formal or 
informal, on financial markets. 
Studies on the influence of central bank communication on financial markets can be broadly 
classified into four categories. (i) The impact of central bank communication on financial market 
returns within one country. For instance, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), based on news wire 
communication, examine how markets in the euro area, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
react to domestic central bank communication. (ii) The effect of central bank communication on the 
volatility of financial markets within one country. Kohn and Sack (2004), for example, report that 
congressional hearings involving members of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) have a significantly 
positive effect on asset volatility in various financial markets. (iii) The spillover effects of 
communication by members of an important central bank on financial market returns in other 
countries. For instance, Hayo et al. (2010) show that US monetary communications have significant 
effects on European and Pacific equity market returns. (iv) The possible impact of spillover effects not 
only in the context of financial market returns but also with regard to volatility. As one part of their 
analysis, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) study the impact of US monetary policy communications on 
Canadian financial markets. They find that US interest rate changes increase volatility on 3-month 
treasury markets, but that US communication does not significantly affect volatility on Canadian 
financial markets. 
An important issue not yet covered in the literature is whether central bank communication induces 
a higher degree of co-movement in financial markets. We address this gap in this literature by 
focussing on the impact of central bank communication on the correlation between different 
financial series. Financial market integration has increased over time, as has interdependence. Ayuso 
and Blanco (2001) provide evidence of this general trend, Bessler and Yang (2003) investigate world 
stock markets, Chen et al. (2002) focus on Latin America, and Kim et al. (2005) look at the euro area. 
Knowledge about the correlation of financial markets is important both from a monetary policy point 
of view, as it enhances the chance of increased co-movements in financial markets which possibly 
reduces the degrees of freedom for monetary policy based on domestic motives, and to individual 
investors trying to reduce the risk of their portfolio by diversification. 
There are at least two ways of studying whether monetary policy communication affects financial 
market correlations: first, by comparing the correlation between different markets within one 
country and, second, by comparing the correlation of the same type of markets across different 
countries. We study this research question in the context of the United States and Canada. Since we 
allow for the impact of cross-country monetary policy communication spillovers in the sense of (iii) 
and (iv) above, we focus on Canada, as Canadian financial markets are affected by US 
macroeconomic shocks and Fed actions and communications (Hayo and Neuenkirch 2012). In terms 
of monetary policy communication, we rely on formal and informal communication by the Fed and 4 
the Bank of Canada (BoC). To provide empirical evidence, we study four combinations of potentially 
increasing financial market correlations in the aftermath of central bank communication: Canadian 
bonds markets with 6 and 10 years’ maturity, equity and bonds markets in Canada, equity markets in 
the United States and Canada, and 10-year bonds in the United States and Canada. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
econometric methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Methodology 
Our financial market variables for the two countries comprise daily closing interest rates changes on 
6-month treasury bills and 10-year government bonds, as well as daily rates of change of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange Index and the S&P 500 Index for the period 2 January 1998 to 31 December 2009. 
We use data on Fed communications from Hayo et al. (2008). The dataset covers 837 speeches and 
201 congressional hearings by Board of Governors members, as well as 94 post-meeting statements 
and 26 monetary policy reports (MPR).
1 In the case of the BoC, we rely on the dataset created by 
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) and extend it until the end of 2009. This dataset contains information 
from 142 speeches, 13 congressional hearings, 85 post-meeting statements, and 44 MPR. Our 
analysis incorporates a subset of these events: only those communications containing information on 
either the US and Canadian economic outlook or the Fed’s and BoC’s future monetary policy course 
are included. In total, we employ eight dummy variables for the occurrence of relevant (i) 
statements, (ii) MPR, (iii) testimony, and (iv) speeches for the Fed and the BoC, respectively. 
Target rate changes by the BoC and the Fed are captured by including indicator variables. Target rate 
change surprises, which occur either after an unscheduled meeting or as an unexpected outcome of 
a meeting, are captured by separate indicators.
2 As control variables, we include several important 
US and Canadian macroeconomic variables that are regularly observed by financial market actors. In 
our analysis, these take the form of dummies for surprises, i.e., the actual release differs from the 
Bloomberg survey of financial market experts. In the case of the United States, we use 11 news items 
typically watched by financial market participants (Ielpo and Guégan 2009).
3 For Canada, we employ 
12 macroeconomic announcements which are taken from the lists of Gravelle and Moessner (2001) 
and Doukas and Switzer (2004).
4 To conserve degrees of freedom for the regression analysis, we 
                                                            
1 Note that our analysis employs a subset of the Hayo et al. (2008) dataset, as we exclude speeches by regional 
presidents. Previous studies show that speeches by regional presidents do not affect US (Hayo et al. 2008) or 
Canadian (Hayo and Neuenkirch 2012) financial markets to any substantial degree. 
2  Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises that occur during scheduled meetings. For instance, a 
‘surprise hike’ can be (i) an unexpected rise in the target rate or (ii) an unchanged target rate when a rate cut 
was expected. Intermeeting moves are naturally classified as surprises.  
3  Advance gross domestic product, industrial production, and trade balance to capture the business cycle 
phase; the Institute for Supply Management manufacturing index and the Conference Board consumer 
confidence rating for producer and consumer confidence; housing starts for real estate effects; nonfarm payroll 
and the unemployment rate to proxy labour market conditions; retail sales for actual consumption; and the 
consumer price index and producer price index for inflation. 
4 Real GDP, capacity utilisation rate, current account, and merchandise trade balance to control for business 
cycle; the Ivey Purchasing Managers Index for producer confidence; housing starts for real estate markets; net 
change in employment and the unemployment rate to proxy labour market conditions; retail sales for actual 5 
create summary indicators for (i) US and (ii) Canadian price indicator surprises, as well as for (iii) US 
and (iv) Canadian announcements of other macroeconomic indicators. 
We use MGARCH models to analyse the question of how target rate changes, central bank 
communication, and macroeconomic surprises affect the correlation of financial market returns in 
two markets. One reason this class of models is used rather sparingly in practical applications is their 
complexity, which often leads to severe convergence problems (for a survey, see Bauwens et al. 
2006). This also explains why we concentrate on pairs of markets rather than the full possible 
system. 
For our dataset, we find that bivariate diagonal-BEKK(1,1) models, proposed by Engle and Kroner 
(1995), provide a good compromise between conducting a multivariate analysis and still achieving 
robust convergence.
5 In addition to obtaining robust convergence, information criteria indicate the 
superiority of diagonal-BEKK models compared to other linear or non-linear combinations of 
univariate GARCH models, particularly O-GARCH, GO-GARCH (van der Weide 2002), CCC (Bollerslev 
1990), DCC (Engle 2002), generalised DCC (Tse and Tsui 2002), and Scalar-BEKK.
6 
Diagonal-BEKK models simultaneously consider factors that have an influence on the variances of the 
time series as well as on their correlation. However, within our framework, these models are 
computationally still too demanding to allow including all variables, i.e., macroeconomic news, 
monetary policy actions, and central bank communications, at the same time in the mean equation 
and in the conditional variance equation. Therefore, in a conservative procedure, we first eliminate 
the influence of all variables on financial market returns and then study the impact of monetary 
policy communication on these filtered variables.
7 We estimate diagonal-BEKK models of the general 
form: 
(1)  yt = μ + cHt + ε  t 
(2)  Ht = C’C+∑ A’i  t-i ’ t-i
q
i=1 Ai +∑ B’jHt-j
p
j=1 Bj 
yt is a vector of N time series, μ is the mean of this process, ε is a white-noise error, H is the 
conditional variance covariance matrix of y, c is a parameter, and C is an NxN matrix, the elements of 
which are zero below the main diagonal. Ai and Bj are NxN matrices. 
For bivariate diagonal-BEKK models, Equation (2) simplifies to: 
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The financial market correlations are then described by: 
(4)  h12,t = c11c12 + a11a22ε1,t-1ε2,t-1 + b11b22h12,t-1 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
consumption; and the consumer price index, industrial product price index, and raw materials price index for 
inflation. 




11< 1.  
6 The hypothesis of constant conditional correlations can be rejected (Engle and Sheppard 2001). 
7  To that end, we regress the univariate financial market returns on all variables of interest and use the 
residuals as filtered series. 6 
Our communication indicators and target rate changes are then included as additional exogenous 
regressors in the volatility Equation (2) by adding: 
F diag(|Zt|)F’ 
F is a 2xf matrix, where f is the number of explanatory variables and Z is the matrix itself (diag implies 
that there are non-zero elements only on the main diagonal). 
As the impact of target rate changes and communication on mean and conditional variance is studied 
elsewhere (Hayo and Neuenkirch 2012), and to economise on space, we focus our attention on the 
effects relevant for the correlations between two filtered financial market series. If our explanatory 
variables have the same sign and are jointly significant across both volatility equations, monetary 
policy actions, central bank communications, and/or macroeconomic surprises increase or reduce 
the correlation between the time series. 
We provide two sets of estimates for the MGARCH models. The first one covers the entire sample 
period 1998–2009; the second one focuses on the financial crisis subsample (August 2007–December 
2009). Central bank communication plays an even more pronounced role during the recent financial 
crisis (for the United States, see Hayo et al. 2008), as central banks put a great deal of effort into 
preparing and explaining both their conventional and unconventional monetary policy actions. Thus, 
using this approach, we can address the question of whether financial market correlations react 
differently during ‘crisis times’ compared to during ‘normal times.’
8 To explore anticipation effects 
and sticky information processing or rational inattention, we also estimate separate models including 
our variables of interest with one lead and one lag, respectively.
9 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Tables 1–4 show the stylised outcome of estimating diagonal-BEKK(1,1) models for four pairs of 
financial markets.
10 Variables marked with * or ** are jointly significant at a 5% or 1% level and have 
the same sign in both conditional variance equations, respectively. Columns labelled ‘Full’ show the 
results for the full sample; the ‘FC’ columns contain the corresponding results for the financial crisis 
subsample. 
Table 1 presents the estimates for 6-month and 10-year Canadian interest rates. The results indicate 
that correlations between Canadian short-term and long-term market interest rates are typically 
negatively affected by expected monetary policy decisions. This implies that interest rate changes at 
the very short end affect the whole term structure in an asymmetric way and cause a decline in the 
correlation between 6-month and 10-year rates. The reverse is found in the case of unexpected 
policy rate changes. Here, we observe a significantly more symmetric movement between these two 
interest rate series. Moreover, these effects are relevant for leads, contemporaneous, and lagged 
interest rate surprises. The influence of expected and unexpected interest rate decisions is slightly 
more significant over the whole sample compared to the financial crisis period. Possibly, this reflects 
                                                            
8 Note that estimation of a model covering the whole sample period and including interaction terms for the 
financial crisis subsample is not feasible within our framework. 
9  Estimation of nested models including lead, contemporaneous, and lagged effects leads to severe 
convergence problems and is not feasible. 
10 Tables A1–A8 in the Appendix provide detailed regression estimates. 7 
both central banks’ reliance on unconventional monetary policy measures after hitting the zero-
lower bound of interest rates during the financial crisis. BoC policy rate changes have a more 
significant effect on correlations when they hit the market as a surprise. 
 
Table 1: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: 6-Month vs. 10-Year Canadian Yields 
   US Lead  US Cont.  US Lag  CAN Lead  CAN Cont.  CAN Lag 
Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC 
IR  –**     –**  –*        –*        –*       
IR  Surprise  +* +**  +**  +** +* +**  +**  –** 
Statement –**  –* 
MPR 
Testimony –* 
Speech –**  +*  –* 
Macro: Price  +*  +**  –** 
Macro: Other     –*  –**  –**          –*           +**
Note: * and ** indicates same sign and joint significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. + and – represents whether the effect on the volatility equation is positive or negative, 
respectively. Columns labelled ‘Full’ show the results for the full sample; columns labelled ‘FC’ contain the 
corresponding results for the financial crisis subsample. Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide the full set of 
regression estimates. 
 
Regarding monetary policy communication, we find that Canadian communication is relevant only in 
the form of post-meeting statements and only over the full sample. Contemporaneous and lagged 
values of this type of news have a significantly negative impact on the correlation of short- and long-
run bond markets in Canada. Thus, they resemble the effects of expected target rate changes. US 
communication is important for these Canadian markets if delivered in the form of a speech or as 
testimony. Speeches appear to affect financial market correlations when entering as leads, 
contemporaneous, and lagged values; testimony is significant only when considered 
contemporaneously. Similar to the case of Canadian communication, the correlation between the 
two Canadian interest rates is declining after an announcement by the Fed. There is one exception, 
namely, speeches in the financial crisis period, which increase the correlation of the two series. 
Macroeconomic surprises from both countries significantly affect correlations. Price news tends to 
increase the correlation between Canadian interest rates, whereas real news has more of a negative 
effect. 
Interestingly, although we examine correlations between two Canadian interest rate series, the 
influence of US variables is roughly the same in terms of significance and direction of effect for both. 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for Canadian long-term interest rates and the TSX stock index. 
In contrast to the pair of Canadian interest rates, here we find only few significant effects. Thus, the 
correlation between these series is barely affected by our explanatory variables. Perhaps surprisingly, 
interest rate decisions do not matter at all. 
 8 
Table 2: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: 10-Year Canadian Yields vs. TSX 
   US Lead  US Cont.  US Lag  CAN Lead  CAN Cont.  CAN Lag 
Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC 
IR                                     
IR Surprise 
Statement +**
MPR –*  +**
Testimony +*  +* 
Speech 
Macro: Price  +*  –* 
Macro: Other                                     
Note: * and ** indicates same sign and joint significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. + and – represents whether the effect on the volatility equation is positive or negative, 
respectively. Columns labelled ‘Full’ show the results for the full sample; columns labelled ‘FC’ contain the 
corresponding results for the financial crisis subsample. Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix provide the full set of 
regression estimates. 
 
Monetary policy communication is relevant only during the financial crisis period, with anticipatory 
effects taking place before BoC statements and lagged effects kicking in after BoC MPR. MPR and 
testimony by the Fed also are significant when entering as lead or contemporaneous values. 
Generally, central bank communication from both the Fed and the BoC increases the correlation 
between these two Canadian markets. 
US price shocks, as the sole macroeconomic indicator, have a significant effect when entering as the 
lead or contemporaneous variable over the full sample period but their effect varies depending on 
the specification. 
 
Table 3: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: TSX vs. S&P 500 
   US Lead  US Cont.  US Lag  CAN Lead  CAN Cont.  CAN Lag 
Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC 
IR                             +*       
IR Surprise  +**  +**  +*  +* 
Statement +* 
MPR +*  +* 
Testimony +*  +* 
Speech +*  +*  +**
Macro: Price  +**  +**
Macro: Other     +**                             +**
Note: * and ** indicates same sign and joint significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. + and – represents whether the effect on the volatility equation is positive or negative, 
respectively. Columns labelled ‘Full’ show the results for the full sample; columns labelled ‘FC’ contain the 
corresponding results for the financial crisis subsample. Table A5 and A6 in the Appendix provide the full set of 
regression estimates. 9 
Table 3 reveals the impact of our explanatory variables on the correlation of US and Canadian equity 
returns. We find that Fed target rate change surprises play an important role, irrespective of whether 
included as lead, contemporaneous, or lagged variables, whereas BoC rate changes are influential 
only during the financial crisis. 
Several types of communication by both central banks affect the conditional correlations between 
equity returns. BoC speeches are significant over the full sample period and especially during the 
financial crisis. In the case of the Fed, we discover that MPRs and testimony play a significant role. US 
price shocks drive correlations over the full sample. 
Other US macroeconomic shocks, as well as Canadian price and other shocks (with a lag), are 
significant only during the financial crisis period. 
Finally, it is remarkable that all the news we consider here leads to an increase in the correlation 
between stock markets in the two countries. 
 
Table 4: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: 10-Year Yields Canada vs. US 
   US Lead  US Cont.  US Lag  CAN Lead  CAN Cont.  CAN Lag 
Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC Full FC 
IR                       –*        –**    
IR  Surprise  +** +** +** +** –**
Statement  +** –* +** –* 
MPR +**  +** –*  +**
Testimony +**  +** +** –**  +** +** 
Speech –**  +*  –*  +* 
Macro: Price  +** +*  –*  –**
Macro: Other  +**  –**  –**  –**          –*             
Note: * and ** indicates same sign and joint significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. + and – represents whether the effect on the volatility equation is positive or negative, 
respectively. Columns labelled ‘Full’ show the results for the full sample; columns labelled ‘FC’ contain the 
corresponding results for the financial crisis subsample. Table A7 and A8 in the Appendix provide the full set of 
regression estimates. 
 
Results for US and Canadian long-term interest rates are reported in Table 4. Similar to the results in 
Table 3, US interest rate surprises have a broad impact on correlations, regardless of whether 
included as lead, contemporaneous, or lagged variable. Expected BoC changes also influence 
correlations but only with a lag (full sample) and a lead (financial crisis). Again, we find that expected 
target rate changes tend to lower financial market correlation, whereas unexpected changes increase 
it. 
Different forms of communication by both central banks affect the correlation between Canadian 
and US long-term interest rates. Congressional hearings are the most important driver of 
correlations. Whereas the effect of US communications shows significant effects irrespective of 
whether included as lag, lead, or current variable, anticipatory effects dominate in the case of the 
BoC. The direction of change in the correlation is somewhat ambiguous. However, the general 10 
tendency is that central bank communication increases the correlation between long-run interest 
rates in both countries. 
Other US macroeconomic announcements affect correlations on the actual day of their 
announcement and on the day prior thereto. Canadian price indicator shocks are particularly 
relevant during the financial crisis. The direction of change is ambiguous, with real macro news 
showing a tendency to decrease the correlation. 
In general, the correlations of 10-year government yields in both countries show the most 
pronounced reaction to interest rate decisions, central bank communications, and macroeconomic 
announcements. News from the United States is slightly more important in general, but clearly 
dominates when it involves interest rate surprises. 
Comparison of all estimations reveals some interesting facts. First, although Tables 1 and 2 present 
the effects on correlations between Canadian financial markets, we find US variables to be an equally 
important driver of these correlations. This indicates that Canadian financial markets are influenced 
to a large degree by economic events in the United States, its most important partner with regard to 
trade and capital flows. Second, correlations between Canadian short-term and long-term interest 
rates are more affected by interest rate surprises than by expected changes. Thus, expected interest 
rate changes do not lead to a change in the conditional yield curve correlations, suggesting that 
financial market actors have already incorporated their impact into their trading. In the case of 
equity markets, US interest rate surprises are the most significant factor influencing the strength of 
the correlation. Finally, central bank communication affects all markets considered, but is particularly 
important for the correlation of 10-year Canadian and US interest rates. Communication significantly 
affects correlations, no matter whether entered as current, lead, or lagged. Generally, 
communication tends to increase the correlation of long-run interest rates in the two countries. 
To understand the quantitative importance of considering the impact of the various types of news, 
we also estimated small diagonal-BEKK models without the explanatory variables. Figures A1–A4 in 
the Appendix plot the difference in conditional correlations between models employing (i) the full 
sample period and contemporaneous explanatory variables and (ii) models without any explanatory 
variables. The graphs show that our variables of interest have a substantial influence on the 
estimated conditional correlations. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The extant literature shows that central bank communication can affect financial market returns and 
volatility within one country and cause spillover effects on financial market returns and volatility in 
other countries. In this paper, we study the correlation between pairs of bond and stock markets (i) 
within Canada and (ii) between Canada and the United States for the period January 1998 to 
December 2009 in the framework of diagonal-BEKK models. Our research question is whether 
monetary policy actions and communications by the BoC and the Fed significantly affect the 
conditional co-movement of financial markets. 
Our results show that central bank communications affect the dynamic correlations between two 
financial markets, both within and across countries. First, even for correlations between Canadian 11 
markets only, we find US variables to be an important influence. This indicates that Canada as a small 
open economy is strongly affected by its most important economic partner, the United States. 
Second, correlations between Canadian short-term and long-term interest rates are significantly 
affected by interest rate surprises. Expected interest rate changes and central bank communications 
cause very little change in the conditional yield curve correlations. In the case of equity markets, US 
interest rate surprises significantly change the correlation between the S&P 500 and the TSX Index. 
Third, central bank communication is particularly important for the correlation of 10-year Canadian 
and US interest rates. The communications significantly affect correlations irrespective of whether 
included as lag, lead, or current variable. Finally, we find that different types of news can increase or 
decrease the correlation of financial markets, within and across countries. Expected target rate 
changes tend to decrease the correlation; surprises have a positive effect. Central bank 
communication tends to have a positive effect as well, but our estimation outcome is somewhat 
ambiguous. Macro news can have positive or negative effects on the correlations, with price news 
showing a tendency to increase correlations and real news having the opposite effect. In addition to 
the evidence based on statistical testing, we graphically show that the inclusion of our variables of 
interest influences estimated conditional correlations in an economically relevant way. 
Our results have important implications. Monetary policy communication can increase co-
movements across financial markets, in particular, between long-term interest rates in Canada and 
the United States. Thus, in addition to spillover effects on returns and volatility of other countries’ 
financial markets, we detect a third channel which a central bank should take into account before 
communicating with the public. Central bank communications by a foreign central bank might reduce 
the degrees of freedom of domestic monetary policy. As we find communications by both the Fed 
and the BoC to significantly affect correlations between financial markets across the two countries, 
this finding is relevant not only for a relatively small economy such as Canada but also for the United 
States. Our findings are relevant to individual investors, too, as central bank communication has the 
potential to limit diversification opportunities as it leads to an increase in correlations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: 6-Month vs. 10-Year Canadian Yields 
   CAN 6M CAN 10Y  CAN 6M CAN 10Y CAN 6M  CAN 10Y
c11  0.0037        0.0000 0.0044    
c12  0.0038 *  0.0000 0.0046 ** 
c22 0.0000  0.0000 *  0.0000 
a1  0.3837 **  0.1707 ** 0.4370 ** 0.1788 ** 0.4039 **  0.1344 **
b1  0.9015 **  0.9746 ** 0.8645 ** 0.9716 ** 0.9148 **  0.9811 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  -0.0206 ** -0.0079     xx -0.0256 ** -0.0130 ** xx 0.0000     0.0000 
IR Surprise  0.0829  **  0.0154  x 0.0770 * -0.0038 0.0135  0.0318  ** xx
Statement 0.0041 0.0126  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0007  -0.0034 
MPR -0.0147  0.0007  -0.0181 -0.0031 -0.0012  -0.0001 
Testimony 0.0019 0.0121  -0.0047 -0.0145 x -0.0036 -0.0087 
Speech -0.0089  *  -0.0072  xx 0.0064 0.0058 -0.0099 -0.0057 x
Macro: Price  0.0000  0.0000  0.0075 0.0022 0.0148  0.0057  x
Macro:  Other  0.0000     0.0000     -0.0134 *  -0.0105 ** xx 0.0000     0.0000    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  -0.0339 ** -0.0077     x 0.0211 -0.0054 0.0000     0.0000 
IR Surprise  0.0818  **  0.0186  xx 0.0909 ** 0.0178 xx -0.0155 -0.0269  *  xx
Statement -0.0134  0.0060  -0.0274 ** -0.0141 ** xx -0.0040 -0.0164  *  x
MPR 0.0000  *  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Testimony 0.0001 0.0173  0.0009 0.0160 0.0001 0.0082 
Speech -0.0069  0.0121  *  -0.0080 0.0109 -0.0034  0.0043 
Macro:  Price  0.0151 **  0.0142 ** xx -0.0145 ** -0.0100 ** xx 0.0093 0.0092 
Macro: Other  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
Observations 2900  2900 2900 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  10717       10700     10482       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
 
Figure A1: Change in Conditional Correlation: 6 Month vs. 10 Year Canadian Yields 
 
Note: Figure plots the difference in conditional correlations between a model employing (i) the full sample 
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Table A2: 6-Month vs. 10-Year Canadian Yields: Financial Crisis 
   CAN 6M CAN 10Y  CAN 6M CAN 10Y CAN 6M  CAN 10Y
c11  0.0013        0.0000 0.0000    
c12 0.0006  0.0000 0.0000 
c22 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
a1  0.4926 **  0.2018 ** 0.5021 ** 0.2218 ** 0.5598 **  0.2115 **
b1  0.8580 **  0.9449 ** 0.8217 ** 0.9523 ** 0.8286 **  0.9582 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  -0.0251  *  -0.0059     -0.0193    -0.0203    x 0.0000     0.0000    
IR  Surprise  0.0957 **  0.0696 ** xx 0.1146 -0.0239 0.0354 -0.0465  **
Statement 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MPR -0.0327  0.0048  -0.0454 -0.0089 0.0230  -0.0204 
Testimony -0.0105 -0.0252  0.0103 0.0226 0.0289 0.0211 
Speech 0.0098  0.0158  x 0.0061 0.0067 0.0234 0.0018 
Macro: Price  -0.0025  -0.0127  -0.0024 -0.0072 -0.0264  -0.0123 
Macro:  Other  -0.0036     -0.0144     x -0.0197 * -0.0135 ** xx 0.0000     0.0000    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  -0.0359     -0.0075     -0.0368 *  -0.0032    x 0.0000     0.0000    
IR Surprise  0.0884  **  0.0085  x 0.0891 ** 0.0147 xx 0.0246 -0.0021 
Statement -0.0112 -0.0010  -0.0125 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 
MPR 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0039  -0.0073 
Testimony -0.0030 0.0244  -0.0001 0.0299 0.0007 0.0252 
Speech -0.0013  -0.0197 -0.0038 -0.0223 0.0000  0.0217  * 
Macro: Price  -0.0033  0.0215  -0.0034 0.0186 *  -0.0162  *  -0.0047 
Macro:  Other  -0.0078 *  -0.0079     x 0.0000    0.0000    0.0099     0.0142  ** xx
Observations 588  588 588 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  2034       2006     1962       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
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Table A3: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: 10-Year Canadian Yields vs. TSX 
   CAN 10Y  TSX  CAN 10Y TSX CAN 10Y  TSX 
c11  0.0011        0.0007 0.0054  ** 
c12 0.0060  -0.0099 -0.0035 
c22 0.0000  0.0000 **  0.0350 
a1  0.1956 **  0.2487 ** 0.2061 ** 0.2550 ** 0.1995 **  0.2426 **
b1  0.9664 **  0.9641 ** 0.9625 ** 0.9622 ** 0.9673 **  0.9665 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
IR Surprise  0.0474 **  0.7600  0.0396 *  0.8286 0.0378  **  0.3084 
Statement -0.0086 0.2367  0.0129 *  -0.2565 * -0.0078 0.2089 
MPR  -0.0126 0.4035 *  0.0133 -0.4275 *  -0.0032  0.4373 **
Testimony 0.0091 0.1800  0.0091 0.2400 0.0000  0.0000 
Speech 0.0112 *  -0.0067 0.0090 -0.0050 0.0076  -0.0110 
Macro: Price  0.0018 0.2265  *  x -0.0011 -0.2230 *  x -0.0048 -0.1982 
Macro: Other  -0.0087 *  -0.0698     -0.0126 *  -0.0746    0.0000     0.0000    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  0.0163    -0.1737     -0.0121    0.2079    -0.0020     -0.3319    
IR Surprise  0.0268 *  0.1672  0.0265 0.1773 0.0270  *  0.2196 
Statement -0.0061 0.2306  0.0132 -0.1526 -0.0078 0.0686 
MPR 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0001  0.0016 
Testimony 0.0265 *  -0.1073  0.0247 *  -0.2013 0.0225  *  -0.2682 
Speech -0.0108 -0.1407  0.0093 0.1465 0.0099  0.1102 
Macro: Price  -0.0136 *  -0.0038  0.0069 0.0067 0.0126  0.0861 
Macro: Other  0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
Observations 2900  2900 2900 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  532       527     508       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
 
Figure A2: Change in Conditional Correlation: 10-Year Canadian Yields vs. TSX 
 
Note: Figure plots the difference in conditional correlations between a model employing (i) the full sample 
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Table A4: 10-Year Canadian Yields vs. TSX: Financial Crisis 
   CAN 10Y  TSX  CAN 10Y TSX CAN 10Y  TSX 
c11  0.0000        0.0082 0.0044    
c12 0.0000  0.0691 -0.0234 
c22 0.0000  **  0.0000 0.0000 
a1  0.1552 0.2971  ** 0.2318 0.3085 ** 0.1534 0.3195  **
b1  0.9406 **  0.9377 ** 0.8853 ** 0.9391 ** 0.9354 **  0.9364 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  -0.0106     0.1089     0.0296    -0.1200    -0.0264     0.2423    
IR  Surprise  0.0715 **  0.9805  0.0653 *  0.7236 -0.0570 *  -1.0872 
Statement -0.0008 -0.1150  0.0052 -0.2373 0.0000 0.0000 
MPR -0.0172  -0.9756  *  x -0.0368 -0.8873 0.0431 0.9027 
Testimony  0.0308 *  0.6987 *  x 0.0413 ** 0.5933 *  x 0.0474 **  0.3095 
Speech -0.0165  -0.1117  0.0218 0.1362 0.0000  0.0000 
Macro:  Price  0.0105 -0.4403  *  0.0226 -0.2942 0.0118 -0.2898 
Macro: Other  0.0170     0.1547     0.0205    0.1343    0.0000     0.0000    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    -0.0174     0.0863    
IR Surprise  0.0288  -0.6734  -0.0164 0.7643 0.0000  0.0000 
Statement 0.0064 1.0402  ** xx -0.0024 0.4546 -0.0006 0.2577 
MPR  0.0000 0.0000  0.0121 0.7402 0.0072 0.8759  ** xx
Testimony -0.0185 0.3675  0.0173 0.3555 0.0000 0.0000 
Speech  0.0181 0.0802  0.0146 0.3197 0.0227 0.4031 
Macro:  Price  0.0308 *  0.2148  -0.0283 -0.1128 0.0268 *  0.4373 
Macro: Other  -0.0077     -0.0248     -0.0185    -0.0701    0.0210  *  0.0587    
Observations 588  588 588 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  -179       -183     -188       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
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Table A5: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: TSX vs. S&P 500 
   TSX  S&P 500  TSX S&P 500 TSX S&P  500
c11  0.0504        0.0458 0.0421    
c12 0.0829  **  0.0653 0.0809  ** 
c22 0.0000  0.0280 0.0000 
a1  0.2275 **  0.2463 ** 0.2279 ** 0.2490 ** 0.2191 **  0.2436 **
b1  0.9692 **  0.9644 ** 0.9693 ** 0.9639 ** 0.9727 **  0.9658 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
IR Surprise  0.8627  **  0.6843  xx 0.8441 ** 0.5815 xx 0.0000 0.0000 
Statement 0.0667  -0.1089  0.0883 -0.1752 0.1540 0.0113 
MPR -0.1423  -0.5024  0.1697 0.5588 *  0.3235  0.5727  ** x
Testimony -0.1269 0.1160  0.2068 -0.0262 0.1483 -0.0591 
Speech 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Macro: Price  0.2315  **  0.1238  0.2561 ** 0.1491 xx -0.1803 -0.0877 
Macro: Other  0.0000     0.0000     -0.0487    -0.0252    0.0724     0.0015    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  -0.0116     -0.2777     0.0660    0.3368 *  0.0047     -0.3072    
IR Surprise  0.2303  0.5319  0.2430 0.5367 0.2096  0.5016 
Statement 0.1898 0.1375  0.0000 0.0000 0.1049 0.1119 
MPR 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Testimony 0.1827 0.1804  0.1934 0.3294 0.2776 0.3625 
Speech 0.0130  0.2596  *  x 0.0156 0.2542 * 0.0153  0.2069 
Macro: Price  0.1271  -0.0142  -0.0491 -0.0064 0.0000  0.0000 
Macro: Other  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
Observations 2900  2900 2900 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  -7734       -7732     -7749       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
 
Figure A3: Change in Conditional Correlation: TSX vs. S&P 500 
 
Note: Figure plots the difference in conditional correlations between a model employing (i) the full sample 
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Table A6: TSX vs. S&P 500: Financial Crisis 
   TSX  S&P 500  TSX S&P 500 TSX S&P  500
c11  1.6022 **      1.7970 ** 1.7130 ** 
c12 1.2598  1.4826 **  1.3784  ** 
c22 0.0000  0.0000 *  0.0001 
a1  0.2202 0.4977 ** 0.2191 ** 0.4962 ** 0.1923  0.4713 **
b1  0.0000    -0.4625     0.0000    -0.4480    0.0000     -0.4556  **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  1.3629    2.1337     -1.0687    -0.4632    0.0000     0.0000    
IR Surprise  3.0590 3.9785  0.8005 3.2633 ** x 2.2131 3.8835 x
Statement 1.1664 1.6095  -0.4209 0.8791 * 0.1126  0.4718 
MPR -0.0001 -0.0001  1.5176 1.3709 x 0.2030 1.3692 
Testimony 1.2370 1.4357  1.7755 2.0555 x 0.9766 1.9035  *  x
Speech 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Macro: Price  -0.2201 0.1047  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0663  0.3186 
Macro: Other  1.2378 *  1.0636  *  xx 0.0421    0.3357    0.6734     0.6060    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  1.0519    0.9048     1.1735    1.3274    x 0.5812     0.2191    
IR Surprise  2.6481 2.5248  1.1844 0.8810 1.0253  1.2450 
Statement 1.2063 *  0.3534  x 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MPR 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.3557  -0.0203 
Testimony 0.4542 0.4438  0.0215 0.5794 0.0736  0.4735 
Speech 0.0000 0.0000  1.8420 0.9679 x 2.0262 1.8780 xx
Macro: Price  1.2051 1.4310  0.2641 -0.2026 1.3678  *  0.8995  xx
Macro: Other  0.2406    -0.0234     0.0000    0.0000    0.5330     0.8272  *  xx
Observations 588  588 588 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  -2087       -2100     -2100       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
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Table A7: Estimating Bivariate Financial Market Correlations: 10-Year Yields Canada vs. US 
   CAN 10Y US 10Y  CAN 10Y US 10Y CAN 10Y  US 10Y
c11  0.0006        0.0005 0.0041  * 
c12 0.0036  -0.0022 0.0041  * 
c22 0.0000  **  0.0000 0.0029  ** 
a1  0.2065 **  0.1909 ** 0.2069 ** 0.1938 ** 0.2096 **  0.1939 **
b1  0.9670 **  0.9723 ** 0.9676 ** 0.9713 ** 0.9686 **  0.9737 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
IR  Surprise  0.0398 **  0.0574 ** xx 0.0245 0.0454 ** xx 0.0090 0.0289 
Statement -0.0072 -0.0051  0.0104 0.0081 0.0139  *  0.0109  xx
MPR 0.0110  0.0197  0.0027 0.0175 -0.0072  0.0093 
Testimony -0.0086 -0.0031  0.0060 0.0153 -0.0055 -0.0124 
Speech  -0.0102 *  -0.0120 *  xx -0.0076 -0.0087 0.0000 0.0000 
Macro: Price  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0044  0.0011 
Macro:  Other  0.0075 *  0.0078     xx -0.0104 ** -0.0114 ** xx 0.0000     0.0000 * 
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  -0.0134     0.0023     -0.0152    -0.0009    -0.0203  **  -0.0147     xx
IR Surprise  0.0093  -0.0194  -0.0110 0.0168 -0.0015  -0.0267 
Statement -0.0080 -0.0172  *  x 0.0120 0.0225 ** xx -0.0113 -0.0173 x
MPR 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Testimony -0.0256 -0.0362  *  xx 0.0128 0.0312 0.0013 0.0202 
Speech -0.0123  -0.0144  x -0.0086 -0.0092 0.0126 0.0122  x
Macro: Price  -0.0139  *  -0.0076  -0.0077 -0.0012 -0.0111  -0.0104  x
Macro: Other  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000    0.0000     0.0000    
Observations 2900  2900 2900 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  10316       10311     10299       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
 
Figure A4: Change in Conditional Correlation: 10-Year Yields Canada vs. US 
 
Note: Figure plots the difference in conditional correlations between a model employing (i) the full sample 
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Table A8: 10-Year Yields Canada vs. US: Financial Crisis 
   CAN 10Y US 10Y  CAN 10Y US 10Y CAN 10Y  US 10Y
c11  0.0000        0.0082 0.0052    
c12 0.0000  0.0054 0.0022 
c22 0.0000  0.0000 **  0.0000 
a1  0.1147 -0.0238  0.1711 0.0148 0.0883 -0.0479 
b1  0.9408 **  0.9624 ** 0.8983 ** 0.9403 ** 0.9549 **  0.9652 **
United States Lead  United States Contemp.  United States Lag 
IR  0.0286     -0.0043     0.0391 *  -0.0021    0.0235     -0.0046    
IR Surprise  0.0729  **  0.0864  ** xx 0.0660 0.0739 ** xx -0.0581 ** -0.0622 *  xx
Statement -0.0023 -0.0120  0.0047 0.0171 0.0014 -0.0122 
MPR 0.0340  *  0.0592  ** xx 0.0399 * 0.0695 ** xx -0.0316 -0.0562 x
Testimony 0.0455  **  0.0772  ** xx 0.0555 ** 0.0943 ** xx 0.0470 **  0.0844 ** xx
Speech 0.0209  0.0211  x -0.0277 -0.0264 0.0000 0.0000 
Macro: Price  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0162 -0.0267 -0.0042  -0.0076 
Macro: Other  -0.0156  *  -0.0209  *  xx -0.0215 ** -0.0329 ** xx 0.0033     0.0092    
Canada Lead  Canada Contemp.  Canada Lag 
IR  -0.0128     -0.0349     x -0.0097    -0.0298    -0.0047     -0.0290    
IR  Surprise  0.0224 -0.0051  -0.0060 0.0297 0.0034 -0.0120 
Statement 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0257  -0.0435 
MPR 0.0118  0.0318  *  xx 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Testimony 0.0260 0.0481  xx 0.0278 0.0476 *  xx 0.0079 0.0182 
Speech  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0167 0.0167 
Macro: Price  0.0249  0.0296  *  xx 0.0273 0.0210 x -0.0287 ** -0.0329 ** xx
Macro: Other  -0.0150     -0.0070     x -0.0153 *  -0.0054    -0.0126     -0.0139    
Observations 588  588 588 
Parameters 41  41 41 
Log-likelihood  1820       1822     1814       
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. x and xx indicates same sign and joint 
significance across both volatility equations at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust. 
 
 
 